© 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5 on the offfensive against falsafa, and that the Mawāqif was evidence of an attempt to develop a new Islamic philosophy and science.4 Because the mutakallimūn saw themselves as victors in the debate with the falāsifa , the mutakallimūn were, then, free to incorporate science and philosophy into kalām.5
On the narrower question of Ījī 's presentation of astronomy (ʿilm al-hayʾa ), Sabra concluded that Ījī 's view of astronomy was "not unlike" the instrumentalist perspective expressed in Osiander's preface to Copernicus ' De Revolutionibus .6 According to Sabra's inter pretation, Ījī took the explanations of the astronomers to be neither true nor even probable; they simply accounted for the ob served phenomena.7 I interpret an instrumentalist view of astronomy to entail retrodictive and predictive accuracy. Sabra raised the possibility that an instrumentalist position might 49-71; 4 Sabra, "Science and Philosophy," 12-13. Sabra observed that with the work of Juwaynī (d. 1085), mutakallimūn "realized that false premises do not necessarily lead to false conclusions." Thus mutakallimūn examined works of falsafa and science to understand and rebut their arguments.
5 Sabra pointed out, in his article, that Ījī was not the fĳirst to con ceive of kalām ontologically, and not theologically, but argued (pp. 13-17, esp. p. 16) (and realism) were positions in the philosophy of science; a fĳigure such as Osiander might have had an instrumentalist position regarding Copernicus ' theories, but one should not presume that he thought that science in gen eral was instrumentalist . Sabra's implication, though, that Ījī was func tioning more as a philosopher of science than as a scientist was apt. correlate with Ghazālī 's critique of causality 8 found in the Incoherence of the Philosophers in that while there was no decisive reason to believe that humans could identify through coincidences what the true intermediate cause was, such causes could exist and could be a useful language for describing natural phenomena .9 The evidence of other scholars from Ījī 's own century, as well as the commentaries on the Mawāqif that defended astronomy, would seem to support Sabra's general assessment that kalām incorporated science and philosophy and that kalām sought to do so on its own terms. Ahmad Dallal's recent Islam, Science, and the Challenge of History has challenged Sabra's thesis that Ījī 's Mawāqif was evidence for kalām 's absorption of science and falsafa .10 As astronomy was the science to which Ījī devoted the most attention, Dallal argued that Ījī 's goal was to destabilize astronomy's (ʿilm al-hayʾa ) foundations and conclusions in order to advance what Dallal saw as kalām's more central strictly 8 Ghazālī's critique of causality in the seventeenth discussion of The Incoherence of the Philosophers has recently been re-assessed in Frank Grifffel, Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 175-214. 9 Sabra, "Science and Philosophy," 38-9. See also Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers , trans. Michael Marmura (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), 166-77. See pp. 167-8 where Ghazālī described a blind man who acquired sight due to the removal of a fĳilm from over his eyes. That man would believe that the cause of sight was the removal of the fĳilm whereas "When, however, the sun sets and the atmosphere becomes dark, he would then know that it is sunlight that is the cause for the imprinting of the colors in his sight." Some, though not all, recent scholarship on Ghazālī has found that Ghazālī accepted at least a version of natural causality in his kalām texts. See, e.g., Richard Frank, Creation and the Cosmic System: Al-Ghazālī and Avicenna (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992) and idem, Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) , 36-9. Frank Grifffel has found that " [a] close reading of the seventeenth discussion shows, how ever, that on its two dozen or so pages, al-Ghazālī does not deny the existence of causal connections-and thus of causality-and he certainly does not argue that efffĳicient causality as an explanation of physical change is false." See Grifffel, Al-Ghazālī, 147. There, Grifffel described Michael Marmura's position that Ghazālī denied causation as "false." See Marmura, "Al-Ghazālī's Attitude towards the Secular Sciences and Logic," in Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. George F. Hourani (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1975), 109.
Sabra ("Science and Philosophy, pointed out that Jurjānī 's response to some of Ījī 's criticisms of astronomy meant that an Ashʿari occasionalist outlook did not necessitate a certain view of astronomy. But even though Ījī and Jurjānī disagreed about the role of astronomy in kalām , the extent to which Ījī 's criticisms of astronomy were correlated with his denial of causality is unclear.
10 Ahmad Dallal, Islam, Science, and the Challenge of Modernity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010), 133. "It is possible, however, to conceive of kalām as an apologetic undertaking that is not a complete philosophical system without diminishing its value as a genuine intellectual pursuit." © 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5 religious arguments and in order to deny the falāsifa recourse to the prestigious science of kalām in order to support their positions. Ījī discussed astronomy in order to remove astronomy from the intellectual arsenal of the falāsifa and to show that all celestial phenomena depended directly on God for their existence .11 Kalām was, inevitably, a science more prestigious than astronomy.12 Dallal com mented on how, throughout the précis of astronomy found in the Mawāqif, Ījī pointed out conceivable alternatives to the astronomers ' formulations. For example, Ījī pointed out that that the planets did not need to be carried on orbs ; cross sections of orbs would sufffĳice.13 Or, the numerous circles that the astronomers traced on the surface of the orbs were wholly imaginary.14 Why would kalām comprise a science that it simultaneously criticized so deeply? Without doubt, Dallal has raised a few questions that Sabra did not fully address. First, when Ījī raised possibilities of alternative explanations, he never actually fleshed out any alternative model. Second, and along the same lines, Dallal argued that Ījī 's discussion of astronomy contained nothing that suggested a positive statement of a distinctively Islamic astronomy. Third, by saying that astronomy's mathematical hypotheses were subject neither to afffĳir- 11 Dallal, Islam, Science, 136. Note, though (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907) , 130 for the possibility of replacing the orbs with rings. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī 's commentary on al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt noted those who suggested that the planets be carried on cross-sections of orbs , belts, tambourines, and the like but categorized those who held such as ideas as ghayr al-muḥaṣṣilīn, 'those who do not discriminate. ' See Ibn Sīnā , al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt maʿa sharḥ Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī , ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo : Dār al-Maʿārif, 1957 -1968 , 3: 187. The key for Ījī 's position in the Mawāqif, it would seem, is whether Ījī meant spherical three-dimensional belts. At the risk of overreading, Ījī 's avoidance of the question meant that he did not have to take a position [cf. Muʾayyad al-Dīn ʿUrḍī, Kitāb al-hayʾa, ed. G. Saliba (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-ʿArabiyya, 1990) , 37] about the likelihood (bi-ʾl-ḥarī) of the celestial bod ie s being spherical (kurī). Note that ʿUrḍī did not attempt to argue there that the celestial bodies were complete orbs .
In kalām , the proposition that the planets might be carried by belts (niṭāqāt) was found in Bayḍāwī's Ṭawāliʿ al-anwār, ed. ʿAbbās Sulaymān (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl and Cairo : al-Maktaba al-Azhariyya li-ʾl-Turāth, 1991), 139.
14 Sabra took these comments as a reflection of Ījī 's position that the astronomers ' physical explanations were, at best, contingent. This article, indeed, will show fĳirst that Ījī 's presentation of as tronomy in the Mawāqif was not instrumentalist . Second, this article will suggest that Ījī 's scepticism about the reliability of observations is related to a position on how well the human intellect can sort out certain sense perceptions from things that are purely imaginary. After all, there were cases (rainbows , eclipses ) where observational and geometric arguments communicated some thing certain about the physical structure of the universe. And sense perceptions had long been considered premises for demonstrations.18 Third and fĳinally, this paper will situate Ījī 's presentation of astronomy within a debate about the role of astronomy within kalām and within other Islamic disciplines more generally. There I will advance a few tentative conclusions about what we gain once we understand that Ījī 's presentation of astronomy was not instrumen talis t. Other Islamic disciplines, e.g. fĳiqh , were more amenable to the probabilist knowledge that astronomy yielded; for Ījī , kalām seems to have demanded a level of demonstrative certainty often unattainable by astronomy. Would a mutakallim , by setting extremely high standards for demonstrations, have, in turn, ceded ground for certain plausible theological arguments to scholars of astronomers ?
Why Ījī was not an Instrumentalist
By attempting to poke holes in astronomy 's instrumentalist value, Ījī actually took on astronomy at its strongest point, where it, by defĳinition, was least contingent. The fĳirst passage I wish to dis cuss, one that has received, to my knowledge, no scholarly attention, deals with explanations for solar and lunar eclipses and of the phases of the moon . Astronomers all said (and would continue to say today) that the moon 's phases are the result of the sun shining light on one hand, and the moon, sun, and earth's positions on the other. Eclipses would occur when the sun , earth , and moon are in a straight line in the same plane. Ījī explored alternatives, alternatives which he never rejected, writing, "Know that Ibn al-Haytham said, regarding the moon's phases, that it could be that way because the moon is a luminous sphere, with one half shining and one half not, and that it rotates on its own with a speed equal to that of its orb. If the luminous side is facing us, then it is a full moon. And if the dark side is toward us, then it's a new moon. In the intervening positions, the portion of the moon visible to us varies. But what we have said about solar and lunar eclipses annuls what Ibn al-Haytham said.19 The response, after considering the hypotheses, is that the negation of this possibility (iḥtimāl) does not negate all possibilities. Perhaps there is another reason, and again what you have mentioned makes it conceivable that, due to God's creation, there is light in the sun and the planets or that they are illuminated by other planets hidden from us."20 Ījī suggested that God might create light in the sun, which is what happens, and/or in the other planets. Or the sun and the rest of the planets might be illuminated by planets not visible to us. It could be that the sun's light comes from an unknown source, but, it would be difffĳicult to explain the moon's phases and eclipses equally as well while pos tulating an unknown, unobserved light source.21 One should note that this comment elicited Jurjānī 's ire; Jurjānī generally appeared less op posed to Ījī 's jibes at the contingency of astronomy's physical explanations. Jurjānī's commentary picked up on these sharp points, saying that, yes, it was possible that there be another reason such as a dull, dark (kamad) planet beneath the orb of the moon that obscures it ( yankhasif bih) in some conjunctions (istiqbālāt), but that astronomers do not know of it.22 In addition, Ījī 's arguments in favor of occasionalism depended on the perception of a natural order; astronomy was crucial for demon strating the reality of that order.23 Thus, since an argument for occasionalism was In order to cast doubt on the validity of astronomers ' explanation of the eclipses ; Ījī has introduced the possibility of an unknown, un observed celestial body. Previously in the précis of astronomy , when Ījī proposed alternatives to the astronomers ' physical models of uniformly rotating orbs , he did not have to contest any observation of uniformly rotating orbs . That is, diffferent confĳigurations of orbs might well not produce different observations. If Ījī 's only concern with astronomy was to argue that it was instrumentalist , that as tronom y's purpose was to save the phenomena, he would not have had to invent heretofore unobserved phenomena. By doing so, Ījī has cast doubt on astronomy's ability to account for or predict planets ' future positions. As a point of contrast, Ghazālī , in the Incoherence of the Philosophers , commented that only the stub born would contest astronomers ' explanation for eclipses .24 Ījī was sceptical of the astronomers' claim that the lunar phases and eclipses were caused by the relative positions of the sun and the moon and that it could not be otherwise.25 Ījī proposed some scenar ios in which things might be otherwise.26
Or, Ījī might have been saying that the constant possibility of new observational data is a reminder not to have undue confĳidence in astronomy . But the move Ījī has made has been to intro duce the possibility of unobserved celestial bodies in order to argue that the astronomers ' explanation might not always be able to ac count for observations. For if these vindicate the Ashʿarite conception of a contingent world." The better one understood the reality of order in nature, the more powerful the spiritual impact of perceptions of a contingent universe would be.
24 Ghazālī, The Incoherence, 6. " [T] hese matters rest on demonstrations-geometric and arithmetical-that leave no room for doubt. Thus, when one who studies these demonstrations and ascertains their proofs, deriv ing thereby information about the time of the two eclipses [and] their ex tent and duration, is told that this is contrary to religion, [such an individual] will not suspect this [science, but] only religion."
25 Cf. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, Manṭiq al-Mulakhkhaṣ, ed. Aḥad Qarāmalikī (Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Imām Ṣādiq, 2002), 345, on how it would be impossible to rule out all other possible explanations including that God made things run in such a way as to create such an efffect with the occurrence of that specifĳic thing without it having an efffect on it.
26 Cf. Morrison, Islam and Science, 110-1 where Rāzī used the (unobserved) possibility of minute variations in motion from one fĳixed star to another to allege that, therefore, the astronomers ' preference of placing all of the fĳixed stars in a single orb was false. See Carlo Nallino, ʿIlm al-falak: tārīkhuh ʿind al-ʿarab fī al-qurūn al-wusṭā (Rome , 1911;  reprinted Cairo : al-Dār al-ʿArabiyya li al-Kitāb and Beirut: Awrāq Sharqiyya, 1911), 257-9.
© 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5 unobserved (cf. Jurjānī 's com ment about a dull planet beneath the orb of the moon ) celestial bodies never afffected observations then, at least by Ghazālī's standards, the phases of the moon and eclipses would always correlate with the relative positions of the sun and the moon. Elsewhere in the Mawāqif , Ījī had written that we could have confĳidence in things that customarily occur (al-ʿādiyyāt); Ījī acknowledged there that we get nowhere by lingering on the possibility that an aged person was, in fact, created that way just a few moments beforehand.27 Or, Ījī could have been going beyond an instrumentalist position that would re mind one of the shakiness of foundations borrowed from falsafa to attacking observations as a foundation for astronomy. Beginning with Bīrūnī , moving through the astronomers at the Marāgha Obser vatory, and culminating with Qūshjī 's vision (reminiscent of Bīrūnī) for an astronomy with foundations solely in observations and mathematics, the astronomers of Islamic societies themselves aimed, as much as possible, to move the foundations of their science away from conclusions borrowed from falsafa.28 Questioning expla nations for eclipses might have been necessary for conclusions based on eclipse data, and the assumption that eclipses were due to the positions of the sun, earth, and moon, was the foundation for any physical model to explain the motions of the moon.
We must also place Ījī 's reference to Ibn al-Haytham in the intel lectual context of what Ibn al-Haytham actually said about eclipses . Since Sabra's article appeared, numerous other publications have independently and externally (i.e. not just on the basis of the Mawāqif ) confĳirmed Sabra's conclusion that by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, scholars such 27 Ījī , Mawāqif , [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . Interestingly, Ījī pointed out that the philosophers (ḥukamāʾ ), who attributed terrestrial occurrences to celestial confĳigurations, might have been unaware of some celestial occurrence be fore recorded history that would have the same efffect of changing the way events would transpire on earth.
28 I am not sure that such a move away from falsafa , on its own (pace Dallal, Islam, Science, 81-2), constitutes a move towards instrumentalism. See Ījī , Mawāqif , 2: 314. In a discussion of mathematical bodies (ajsām taʿlīmiyya), Ījī wrote that the evidence of mathematics was certain, giving the soul a type of knowledge of which it could not be convinced otherwise. Jurjānī clarifĳied in his commentary (Mawāqif, 2: 317-8) that the wahm (estimation) was the place (maḥall) of mathematical bodies, though the wahm itself is not a body, but rather one of the corporeal faculties (quwan jismāniyya). There is an important discussion in Mawāqif, 2: 318 (Jurjānī's commentary) about how mathematical bodies are real.
On Qūshjī , see Ragep, "Freeing Astronomy," 49-71. Dallal used this article to place Qūshjī at the culmination of a trend in which astronomers attempted to separate astronomy from falsafa . See Dallal, Islam, Science, 82 . I may difffer from Dallal, though, in holding that these astronomers were still making realist or probabilist claims.
© 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5 as Ījī must have studied astron om y.29 Ījī 's insinuation that eclipses were not necessarily due just to the interposition of the sun, moon , and earth relied on a misunderstanding of a statement by Ibn al-Haytham about the luminosity of the moon. Ījī alleged that Ibn al-Haytham wrote that the moon might very well be self-luminous and, then, that the phases of the moon could be due only to the moon's own rotation in its orb. A full moon would be when the moon's luminous face was facing the earth.30 Ījī argued, seemingly correctly, that the evidence of eclipses showed that Ibn al-Haytham's theory was wrong. But the disproving of one alternative did not entail the rejection of all alternative explanations for eclipses , so perhaps the moon and other planets were illuminated by a source other than the sun, etc.
The problem was that Ījī misunderstood Ibn al-Haytham ; Ibn al-Haytham, in fact, wrote that while other planets besides the sun could be luminous, the moon was not luminous. Here Ījī presented ḥads as one of the ways to fĳind the premises of a syllogism, a means of speculation (naẓar ), the way of confĳirming (ithbāt) religious creeds. Because kalām (Mawāqif, 1: 43) was a science that did not (hence could not) depend on the fĳindings of another science (as hayʾa did), Ījī wanted to ascertain that any fĳinding from astronomy was acceptable according to the epistemology of kalām. If a fĳinding of astronomy could not meet the standards of Ījī 's kalām, then that fĳinding of astronomy would be like knowledge of Islam garnered solely from, say, the Bible.
Once again, Ījī 's criticism of astronomy comes, as far as Ījī knows, from within astronomy.
An important defĳinition of ḥads came in Ibn Sīnā 's Shifā '. See Ibn Sīnā, 192 . Ḥads (intuition) was the movement of a faculty of the soul to grasping the middle term of a syllogism on its own, such as the intuition that the phases of the moon are due to the moon 's position with respect to the sun. (2005): 287. Ījī also remarked on the distinction between innī and limmī proofs, roughly paralleling Aristotle's distinction between the proof of the fact and the proof of the reasoned fact (Posterior Analytics, Bk 1, Ch 13). Ījī defĳined an innī demonstration as reasoning from the efffect to the cause, giving the example of a fever leading one to infer a decay of the humors (taʿafffun al-akhlāṭ; Mawāqif , 1: 177). See also Ṭūsī's Sharḥ al-Ishārāt where a tertian fever (ḥummā al-ghibb) arose in the discussion of innī and limmī proofs. See Ibn Sīnā , al-Ishārāt, 1: 487. Ibn Sīnā also mentioned eclipses as an example of a limmī proof. In Posterior Analytics 78b20, Aristotle explained that if the absence of balanced heat led to sickness, then the presence of balanced heat brought health. Subsequently, Aristotle recognized that the boundaries of innī and limmī proofs difffered from one science to another. For the role of innī proofs in astronomy see Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī , Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī 's Memoir on Astronomy (al-Tadhkira fī ʿilm al-hayʾa ), ed. and trans. F. Jamil Ragep (New York: Springer, 1993) , 39. Indeed, it seems that Ījī has diffferent standards for astronomy regarding the principle that if the absence of x entails the absence of y, then the presence of x entails the presence of y. 35 Langermann, "Ibn Kammūna, " 293. 36 Ījī, Mawāqif, 1: 197. 37 Langermann, "Ibn Kammūna," 295. Niẓām al-Dīn Nīsābūrī, in his Kashf-i Ḥaqāʾiq-i Zīj-i Īlkhānī, validated astrological prognostications with the principle of ḥads , drawing general conclusions from specifĳic instances (see Morrison, Islam and Science, 67) . He also defĳined ḥads in his tafsīr entitled Gharāʾib al-Qurʾān wa-raghāʾib al-furqān (see Morrison, Islam and Science, 143 The second passage in the Mawāqif that I would like to discuss that would militate against concluding that Ījī 's presentation of astronomy was instrumentalist is his comments on the sphericity of the earth . Ījī began the paragraph by stating that they (the astronomers or falāsifa ) alleged (zaʿamū) that the earth was spherical (kurawiyya ).38 They acknowledged that the earth was not perfectly spherical, but that the undulations that did exist were comparatively insignifĳi cant. At the end of the paragraph he remarked: "granted that what you have mentioned is like that, so what do you say about what is covered with water?"39 Then, Ījī commented that simplicity (al-basāṭa) necessitates the sphere, but that undulations, even un observable ones or minute ones, prevent the recourse to sphericity. Thus, he has implied that if the efffect (sphericity) is not certain, the cause (simplicity) cannot be presumed. Jurjānī , in his commentary, reminded the reader that while it is possible that there might be hid den undulations, mathematical astronomers (arbāb al-taʿālīm) are content with ( yaktafūn) what appears to the senses.40 We see, fĳirst, that Ījī has strayed from the instrumentalist task of just saving the phenomena. In order to undercut the physical assumptions of astronomers , Ījī had to propose undulations in the Earth that had not been observed because they were under water. But undulations that had not been observed would not afffect observations; thus they would be beyond the scope, probably, of ʿilm al-hayʾa , and certainly beyond that of mathematical astronomy. Were astronomy's purpose simply to explain the observations, Ījī could have presumed the sphericity of the earth . Second, if Ījī 's goal were to undercut the presumption of the Earth's simplicity, then he would be better offf relying on undula tions that have actually been observed rather than underwater un dulations that may or may not exist. By conceding that the notice able undulations could not sufffĳiciently upset the presumption of the earth's simplicity, he had to resort to the possibility that beneath the oceans were mountains that, were they visible, could upset the pre sumption, based on observations, of the earth's simplicity. duty. It undercut the observations that bolstered the astronomers ' adoption of principles from falsafa and it worked to deprive the astronomers of claiming the certitude of arguments based solely on observation. The fĳind-ings of falsafa would then be, after all, only persuasive (iqnāʿī).42 Hence, if sense perceptions, in addition, were wrong, astronomy's accuracy, even as a set of mathematical models, would be called into question.
The third and fĳinal aspect of Ījī 's presentation of astronomy that I would like to focus on, in order to argue that the presentation of as tronom y in Kitāb al-Mawāqif was not instrumentalist , was Ījī 's statement that the equant was a difffĳiculty in the model for Mercury that astronomers could not solve.43 The matter of the equant arose from Ptolemy 's conclusion that certain motions of planets were uniform about axes that did not run through the center of the orb, but rather those motions were uniform about an axis that ran through an offf-center point called the equant. The only way that an orb could, in fact, rotate uniformly in place would be about an axis that did run through the center of that orb. In other words, Ījī un derstood, correctly, that the equant threatened the astronomers ' principle that celestial motions were uniform and circular and that that principle motivated the entire discipline.44 Ījī wrote, à propos astronomers ' concern about the equant point, that, perhaps, partial inclinations (irādāt juzʾiyya) would sufffĳice to produce motions that appeared uniform about the equant point. If astronomers accepted that proposition then there was no reason to be concerned about the equant point and there was no reason to be concerned with trying to resolve the problem.45 Jurjānī , in his commentary on the Mawāqif, related the problem with Mercury to the difffĳiculty (ishkāl) associ ated with the other planets, an ishkāl that had been solved.46 Ījī con cluded that the truth was to transfer (iḥāla) © 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5 everything to al-qādir al-mukhtār.47 Jurjānī added that this was the salvation (manjāh) from all these difffĳiculties.48 Astronomers' solutions to these difffĳiculties did not seem to play a role. ʿUrḍī, in his Kitāb al-Hayʾa , a text written before the construc tion of the Marāgha Observatory , put it diffferently. He pointed out à propos the Ptolemaic equant point, that if orbs could speed up and slow down, there would be no need for any of the orbs that Ptolemy proposed such as eccentrics and epicycles.49 By implication, if orbs could speed up and slow down, what would prevent them from moving backward and forward? Thus ʿUrḍī has argued that scepticism about the need for solutions of the difffĳiculty of the equant point meant, by extension, scepticism about the enterprise of astronomy. In fact, the most noteworthy achievement of astronomers in Islamic civilization, including astronomers known to Rashīd al-Dīn , were models that solved the equant problem. That is, astronomers of Islamic civilization, beginning with Ṭūsī and ʿUrḍī, proposed models that retained the predictive and retrodictive accuracy of Ptolemy's models but in which all the orbs rotated uniformly about axes passing through their centers. mathematically equivalent Mercury models without taking a position on which one was the real model. But the inclusion of uniformly rotating orbs remained the criterion of viability, mean ing that predictive accuracy alone was insufffĳicient. Thus, Khafrī 's multiple solutions for Mercury implied (though he did not say so himself) that solutions composed of uniformly rotating orbs were better than solutions that involved orbs that did not rotate uniformly. By questioning the need for the orbs ' motions to be uni form, Ījī undermined the grounds for the argument that models with uniform motions were probably better than those without. Finally, if Khafrī was an instrumentalist , he was an instrumentalist operating within the project of astronomy which was to explain complex celes tial motion s in terms of uniform rotational motions.
Ījī 's lack of awareness of recent developments extended to optics , in this case the explanation for the phenomenon of the rainbow . Ījī ex plained that the colors of the rainbow difffer according to the parts/atoms (ajzāʾ) of the clouds and what is behind them, and the light from heavy bodies that is reflected from them. An eminent scholar of our time (baʿḍ al-fuḍalāʾ min zamāninā) has opined that a prism (kaʿb ʿāl in ) maintains ( yaddaʿī) the falsehood of that. But it is the opinion of most (ra ʾy al-jumhūr), so we have men tioned it here following them.53
In his commentary, Jurjānī identifĳied this eminent scholar as Kamāl al-Dīn Fārisī (d. 1320) .54 Fārisī found, by conducting an experi ment with a transparent sphere, that the colors of the rainbow were the product of rays of light being refracted a second time after being refracted within the droplets of water.55 This is, indeed, an important part of the Mawāqif because Fārisī's experiment regarding the rainbow indicates how it was possible to provide an explanation, based on experiment, for physical phenomena. A rainbow was not material with the color of the spec trum in the sky, but rather light broken down into the color of the spectrum. This experiment, within the science of optics , was, per haps, a threat to Ījī 's portrayal of science because the demonstra tions that supported it were geometric and mathematical . On the next page of the commentary, Jurjānī cited Rāzī's al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyya where it was alleged that the cause of these atmospheric phenomena, rainbows , were celestial conjunctions (ittiṣālāt falakiyya).58 Or, non-material powers (quwan rūḥāniyya) brought about their existence. Then Jurjānī wrote that atmospheric pheno mena such as rainbows were not imaginary (min qabīl al-khayālāt ). Were such phenomena imaginary, it would be like seeing one's image in the mirror while knowing that oneself, in the truth of the matter ( fī nafs al-amr ), is not in the mirror.59 Rainbows, then, were real. My colleague İhsan Fazlıoğlu of Istanbul Medeniyet University has drawn my attention to the importance of this phrase (nafs al-amr) as a technical term and is preparing a lengthy study of the subject.60 Jurjānī was saying that it is the mode of existence known 56 Jurjānī mentioned Fārisī by name on Mawāqif , 2: 603. 57 Ījī certainly had grounds for insinuating that observers did not always know what they saw. For instance he commented, at the beginning of his précis of astronomy (Mawāqif , 2: 400) that geometers (muhandisūn) who found that the orb of Venus was above the sun would, then, discredit Avicenna's statement that he observed Venus as a blemish on the face of the sun. See Bernard Goldstein, "Some Medieval Reports of Venus and Mercury Transits," Centaurus 14 (1969): 52-3. But what the geometers' position, if true, would really have meant was that whatever Ibn Sīnā observed in the face of the sun, it was not Venus. Thus, the question was not necessarily even whether Ibn Sīnā observed a transit, but whether Ibn Sīnā could discern which planet it was; Ibn Bājja had observed a Mercury transit. Goldstein, "Some Medieval Reports," 55. Also interesting is Goldstein's (p. 54) account of Gersonides' argument for why transit observations were not, actually, observations of Venus and Mercury transiting the sun. '63 This comment has also been interpreted as a broad er defense of astronomy since, again, the question, as it was with the rainbow , would be whether there was another correct way to imagine the same circles.
Jurjānī wrote a short treatise entitled Risāla fī taḥqīq nafs al-amr waʾl-farq baynahu wa-bayn al-khārij. Recep Duran has edited the treatise and has translated it into Turkish. Jurjānī explained that ascertaining something (taḥaqquq al-ashyāʾ) is a supposition ( farḍ) that is either within the faculties of perception or external to them. But nafs al-amr is more general than external existence (aʿamm min al-khārij). That is, a compound body might be compound in the truth of the matter ( fī nafs al-amr), but not externally if such a body does not exist externally.64 The example Jurjānī gave was of a blackness (sawād) that did not exist externally but did in itself ( fī nafsih). Such a blackness might plausibly exist, unlike, say, a three-headed monster or the abstractions of numbers. Rather such a blackness was a color just like colors the external existence of which has been assented to because the scope of that which exists in nafs alamr subsumes that which exists externally.65 Jurjānī cautioned that most errors resulted from confusion of the determination (ḥukm) of the intellect (dhihn ), external reality, and the truth of the matter (nafs al-amr).66 61 Ījī , Mawāqif , 2: 410. See also Sabra, "Science and Philosophy," 37. 62 Ījī , Mawāqif , 2: 432. The quoted translation comes from Sabra, "Science and Philosophy," 37.
63 Although Jurjānī , when returning to a blackness (sawād) not existing (maʿdūm) externally might be a color in itself (fī nafsih). Thus, nafs al-amr might be better understood as a mode of existence. 64 Duran, " 103. 65 So the application of nafs al-amr to prove non-existence is more narrow than applying externality (Duran, " 103) .
66 Duran, "Nefsüʾl-emr Risaleleri," 104.
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An earlier commentator on the Tadhkira, Niẓām al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī , understood knowledge gained from the nafs al-amr to be equivalent to syllogistic knowledge.67 As Kashf al-Ẓunūn put it, the existence of something in nafs al-amr depended directly on neither the mind (dhihn) or external reality.68 Though explanations of 'the truth of the matter' varied and are sometimes difffĳicult to understand, it is clear that existence in the truth of the matter was not the same as mental existence (al-wujūd al-dhihnī) or as external existence but was a real form of existence.
Correlations with Occasionalism?
al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī 's (d. 1325) Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād was also from the Tabriz circle of Rashīd al-Dīn .69 When Ḥillī (a Shiite) came to Ṭūsī's account of the orbs in the Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād, Ḥillī commented, though not at the length at which Ījī did, in a tone that was as critical as Ījī 's. Ḥillī's strongest critiques of astronomy came with his arguments against the astronomers ' arguments for the transparency (shafffāfa) of the orbs . The astronomers ' argument that the orbs were simple, and consequently for the orbs ' transparency, was contradicted (manqūḍ) by the example of the moon .70 Though Ḥillī did not specify what it was about the moon (the moon's color comes to mind), manqūḍ was a strong word. The moon's observed color contested but did not necessarily contradict the astronomers . The second argument, that what was beyond the orbs , e.g. the stars fĳixed in the eighth orb, was not obscured from sight, was deemed by Ḥillī only presumptive (ẓannī) and not certain. He argued that it was possible that the orbs had a weak color insufffĳicient to obscure the stars from sight. This is a distinction without a diffference as Ḥillī could not contest either the observations themselves or the functional transparency of the orbs . Ḥillī also pointed to the problem of planetary distances, namely the principle that the greatest distance of a planet must be the least distance of the planet above it, as an area of uncertainty as the jawzahr of the moon 67 Niẓām al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī , Tawḍīḥ al-Tadhkira, MS Fatih 3397, fol. 13r apud the distinction between innī and limmī proofs. intervened between the moon's greatest distance and the nearest distance of Mercury .71 According to the astronomers , the planets ' orbs had to nest within each other lest there be a void between orbs .72 Thus, a mutakallim's position was as correlated with his commitment to the discipline of astronomy as it was with his intellectual tradition in kalām ; aside from the fact that Ījī 's treatment of astronomy was more extensive, Ḥillī's was as critical. 73 Ḥillī's criticisms of astronomy are fascinating because they went beyond asserting the contingency of the astronomers ' (and Ṭūsī's) conclusions. Even more important, they came in a text that explicitly recognized causality .74 Thus, it would be difffĳicult to correlate Ḥillī's position on astronomy with his position on causality.75 Given Ījī 's chronologically posterior position to Ḥillī in the circle of Rashīd al-Dīn , Ḥillī's concern for certainty and kalām must have been more compelling than the general question of causality. Eichner has noted in Ḥillī's Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād an emphasis on rationalist demonstration.76 And Sabine Schmidtke has noted that Ḥillī never defended philosophy at the expense of his views on kalām. 77 (mabādi' al-burhān) , Rāzī enumerated fĳive: awwaliyyāt (the a priori), things that have been observed (mushāhadāt ), mutawātirāt , experiences (mujarrabāt ), and ḥadsiyyāt . Regarding ḥadsiyyāt, Rāzī remarked that our example is our conviction (iʿtiqādunā) that the light of the moon comes from the sun owing to how we see the phases (ikhtilāf ashkālih). But Rāzī said that he had already shown the weakness of that premise (muqaddima) in ḥikma, for that premise was neither sensed (maḥsūs) nor a priori (awwalī). He explained that what is sensed is the phases of the moon ; that the phases are due to the moon's proximity and distance from the moon is not sensed. Thus a demonstration would be necessary. And since it requires a proof, the explanation for the phases of the moon could not be certain on its own; therefore intuition (ḥads ) cannot be numbered among the premises (al-mabādiʾ) .81 It appears that Rāzī's strategy, then, has been to exclude 79 See Sabra, "Science and Philosophy," 10: "As the fourteenth-century Ashʿarite al-Ījī as to put it in unequivocal terms, the fĳirst advantage of kalām was to raise the adept 'from the perigee of taqlīd to the apogee of certainty'." On the non-deductive nature of astronomy , George Saliba perceived that the mutakallimūn 's qualms with astronomy had to do with how the principles of astronomy were not self-evident. See Saliba "Astronomy and Astrology in Medieval Arabic Thought," in Les doctrines de la science de l'antiquité à l'âge classique, eds. Roshdi Rashed and Joël Biard (Leuven, Dudley, MA: Peeters, 1999), 148-9. 80 On the signifĳicance of Rāzī's al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-ḥikma , see Eichner, The PostAvicennian Philosophical Tradition, 32. For the portion of the text under discussion, see Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī , Manṭiq al-mulakhkhaṣ, ed. Qaramquli (Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Imām Ṣādiq, 2002), 344-54. 81 Rāzī, Manṭiq al-mulakhkhaṣ, 344-5. © 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5
ḥads from the list of acceptable principles for a syl logism by noting that it is not a sense perception.82 Subsequently, Rāzī went on to attack experientia (mujarrabāt ) as a way to obtain a premise of a syllogism.83 He cited the observation that diarrhea has been observed to occur upon taking scammony (saqmūniyā) time after time (marra baʿd ukhrā). His critique was far-reaching: correlating diarrhea and scammony depended on ob serving the efffect (diarrhea) when scammony was taken. The impli cation is that one could not be forever certain of the correlation. Seemingly implicit, too, is occasionalism as one might otherwise argue that there was an element in the scammony that caused diarr hea to occur. From that position comes Rāzī's conclusion: sense per ceptions do not yield universal certainty (al-ḥiss lā yuʿṭī al-qaḍiyya al-kulliyya al-yaqīniyya) .84 Rāzī has attempted to weaken ʿilm al-hayʾa 's claim to any certain knowledge, meaning that little of what the astronomers say could be considered to meet the demonstrative standards of kalām . Rāzī's position on sense perceptions reminds one of Ījī 's attempts to undermine confĳidence in observations.
Ījī also provided his own cautious assessment of ḥadsiyyāt , mujarrabāt , and mutawātirāt in the Mawāqif .85 As Rāzī had written (and Ṭūsī would agree in his Tajrīd al-manṭiq), the main support (ʿumda) for demonstrations was fĳirst principles (awwaliyyāt ).86 Ījī ar gued that while ḥadsiyyāt, mujarrabāt, and mutawātirāt could be a sa tisfactory argument for an individual, these premises would not ne cessarily serve to convince someone who, say, lacked the intuition or the transmitted material. It would not be possible to convince an opponent by rejecting all alternatives (ʿalā sabīl al-munākara), per haps for the reason that Rāzī mentioned. Conversely, only the truly defĳicient would lack the fĳirst principles. The only way to use induc tion comprehensively would be by conceiving of the two extremes, 82 Notably, Ījī did acknowledge ḥads when he listed the possible premises of a demonstration. Ṭūsī also excluded ḥads from the premises of a demonstration in his Tajrīd al-Manṭiq, but he allowed that ḥads could lead one to the middle term of a syllogism. See Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī , Tajrīd al-Manṭiq, [no and that would not always be possible.87 Without the ability to form an induction by arguing from the two extremes, the intellect would need something to help it in its judgment. Sometimes that would be the estimative faculty (al-wahm ), a faculty Ījī explained was capable of error.88 While Ījī 's position may have difffered from Rāzī's in that Ījī may have acknowledged that some sense perceptions did provide certain knowledge, Ījī has left room to doubt some demonstrations, e.g. those of the astronomers , based heavily on sense perceptions.
The second implication of concluding that Rāzī's discussion of astronomy was not instrumentalist is that one might speculate that Ījī discussed astronomy in the way that he did in order to reinforce a distinction between ʿilm and fĳiqh .89 By Ījī 's time, astronomy (ʿilm al-hayʾa ) had become part of a tradition of religious scholarship and the astronomers , like the fuqahāʾ (for God's law in a particular in stance cannot always be known with certainty) depended necessari ly on probabilist reasoning. Because kalām sought ʿilm, not taqlīd , kalām had to distinguish itself from the demonstrative standards of fĳiqh and astronomy inasmuch as astronomy's reasoning resembled that of fĳiqh. Niẓām al-Dīn Nīsābūrī, in fact, pointed out similarities between the uṣūl of fĳiqh and the uṣūl of astronomy. 90 In another text, Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī , in his Maḥṣūl, a work about fĳiqh, used the word ḥadsiyyāt (along with mujarrabāt ) in a way that was closer to 'conjectures on the basis of experience' than it was to 'intuition.'91 Because the Mawāqif appropriated falsafa 's epistemological termi nology and methods of demonstration, Ījī had to pay special atten tion to the way astronomers interpreted those terms and methods to arrive at probabilistic knowledge, a type of knowledge that, again, was quite helpful in fĳiqh. He was concerned that the same method of speculation (such as ḥads ) that led to © 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5 probable knowledge in astro nom y, and of God's law in fĳiqh, might be used to garner certain knowledge of God in kalām. Another example would be how, at the beginning of his précis of astronomy, he reviewed how the astrono mer s established the order of the orbs .92 Determining whether Venus and Mercury were above or below the sun depended on trans it observations, a tricky undertaking.93 This second example repre sents a critique that would have been and was valid for the astrono mer s themselves; transit observations as well as the determination of planetary sizes and distances were notably difffĳicult. Jurjānī 's res ponse, though, involved a legal term-istiḥsān (preference).94 That was also the process through which astronomers determined the or der of the planets , as placing Venus and Mercury below the sun met criteria of symmetry.95 In sum, the reasoning of the astronomers evinced parallels with the reasoning of the fuqahāʾ, reasoning that led to fĳiqh, not the ʿilm that kalām sought. 96 Third, Ījī 's critical depiction of astronomy indicates that natural theology , using an appreciation of nature to come to conclusions about God and God's actions, must have been a heated topic of debate in kalām without being a formally-defĳined topic of kalām. Ījī 's points that scientists' explanations were not certain were an argument for how God's existence and power over nature were certain. In his own arguments, he combined a sense of wonder with a reminder that God was the only knowable cause of the wonders of nature. A crucial part of Ījī 's argument was that the human intellect 's inability to explain certain features of nature would heighten one's sense of wonder.97 Near the end of his précis of ʿilm al-hayʾa , Ījī mentioned his reasons for his presentation of the topic. He wrote:
In the Earth are hills and depressions due to external reasons, and successive cols without any beginning to them. Water flows, naturally, to the depressions, and the hills are found to be a source of life (maʿāsh) for animals and vegetables. No reason for it has been mentioned except for God's providence/solicitude (ʿināya) in animals and plants, for without that their creation and endurance would not be possible. And this recourse to al-qādir al-mukhtār it is specifying a part of the simple [substance-al-basīṭ] to be prepared to receive as opposed to another with the relationship of the prepared material to it being something that the intellect has no path to.98
Jurjānī did not criticize this statement.
Ījī 's sometime scepticism of even astronomy 's instrumental value created a way for scientists to argue for a diffferent, though related, sense of wonder. Nīsābūrī's writings on ʿilm al-hayʾa contained re marks, as had other texts on astronomy of that era, about God's role in certain phenomena (e.g. eclipses ). The most extensive of such comments, and one of the most meaningful for asserting the reli gious value of ʿilm al-hayʾa as practiced by the astronomers , came in the course of the discussion of retrograde motion in Tawḍīḥ al-Tadhkira. Retrograde motion is when the planets halt their west to east motion, move from east to west for a short time, then resume their previous west to east motion. This was an exceedingly com plex phenomenon that attracted a dedicated treatise from Kamāl al-Dīn al-Fārisī .99 Nīsābūrī wrote:
I say: some of the proofs of these laws (qawānīn)100 are actually mentioned in the Almagest , and some are not mentioned, only potentially. And I have produced all of them here (akhrajtuhā al-jamīʿ hāhunā ilā al-fĳiʿl) set forth in detail and made easy, especially the demonstration of the planet's retrogradation in the uppermost portions of the epicycle or the eccentric, how the two hypotheses agree there, and the conditions for that. And these things from the Almagest are in a state of neglect and the author (Ṭūsī) 100 Here he is commenting on the penultimate portion of the chapter on uṣūl II.
[10]: "These then are models and rules that should be known. We have only stated them here; their geometric proofs are given in the Almagest ." (Tadhkira, 140-1) For the Tuḥfa, cf. Morrison, "Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī 's Hypotheses," 62. abbreviated the demonstration by speaking extremely generally. And by my life (la-ʿumrī), achieving truth in eliciting the reasons that necessitate the observed variations of the planets , with their motions being themselves ( fī anfusihā) uniform, is something of majestic import (amr ʿaẓīm al-qadr) and truly complete (a true complement?) for the mathematical perspective of philosophy ( fa-tamām li-l-naẓar al-taʿlīmī min al-falsafa ) . And as for its great import, it is because what it rests on regarding that [the mathematical perspective] are things found in the observable divine bodies which are among the observed bodies (al-ajsām al-ilāhiyya allatī min bayn al-ajsām al-marʾiyya), whose afffairs proceed directly and orderly although it is my opinion that it is presumed that they are sought at a distance (baʿīd al-marām), and it was not like that.101
First, Nīsābūrī 's reference to proofs (barāhīn) is notable, as it reminded the reader of the astronomers ' view that astronomy 's conclusions were demonstrable if one accepted astronomy's predictive ability. Second, Nīsābūrī noted the equivalence of the eccentric and epicyclic hypotheses, meaning that he was not claiming that the usual causal explanation, an epicycle with an eccentric deferent, surely existed externally. Nīsābūrī, nevertheless, did seem to be saying that it would be difffĳicult to conceive of a meaningfully diffferent alternative to the astronomers ' explanation as eccentrics and eccentrics served to explain not only the planets ' observed variations in longitude, including the loops of retrogradation, but also the observed variations in distance from the earth due to the size of the epicycle; such variations would be particularly notable in the case of Mars . Two possible conclusions from Nīsābūrī's remarks are possible, and both of them would be compelling to a reader interested in arguments about God based on nature. First, and most likely, the efffectiveness of the astronomers ' explanations for retrograde motion indicated these models were a step in the right direction towards understanding the structure of the heavens, a structure that would be a source of wonder. Failing that, a second conclusion, foreshadowing an argument that Qūshjī would make later, was that the ability of the astronomer's models to explain the hypotheses would be, itself, a source of wonder.102 © 2014 Koninklijke Brill NV ISBN 978-90-04-25539-5
Conclusion
Heidrun Eichner has observed that kalām texts associated with the Marāgha astronomers begin with the format of a philosophical text, which she argues at length was based on Rāzī's al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-ḥikma and that, throughout the Ilkhanid period, these texts were characterized by discussions among mutakallimūn .103 Thus Ījī 's posi tion on science104 was not, as Dallal implied, the position of kalām on science; rather, Ījī represented a point in a debate. In addition, Eichner has proposed that at Marāgha astronomy texts were, in fact, produced in the context of debates about kalām.105 More advanced science texts might have been produced in a dialogue with kalām and would have more sophisticated arguments for the religious va lue of scientifĳic theories contained within. Researching the connec tion that Eichner has proposed between astronomy and kalām at Marāgha would help explain why more sceptical accounts of astro nom y sometimes contained erroneous and/or incomplete portrayals of the state of the discipline. But what is already clear is that Ījī and others' (mentioned in this article have been Rāzī and Ḥillī) denial of astronomy's instrumentalist and predictive value meant that more scientifĳically-informed religious scholars (e.g. Nīsābūrī and Jurjānī ) could and did legitimately contest Ījī 's position as a foundation for arguments about natural theology .
